Ludwig Wittgenstein: Anti-Philosopher

by Joseph H. Engelsman


Does language shape reality? Can philosophy give us a truly objective account of reality? Are the concepts that determine reality linguistic and not mental?

These are the questions that the Viennese philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) concerned himself with. In an attempt to answer these questions, Wittgenstein wrote two books which present opposing views on this subject. His first book, the only one published in his lifetime, presents a theory about the logical nature of truth. Approximately 32 years later, in another book, he disavowed most of what he stated in the first book. This is the only case in the history of philosophy in which a major philosopher has presented two different sets of beliefs, each the antithesis of the other.

Philosophical statements are rejected in both books as being non-sensical, but for different reasons. Wittgenstein's claim that philosophical statements are nonsensical placed him in a radical position in philosophy. This is the reason I call him an anti- philosopher. This idea eliminates much (but not all) of western philosophical thought and along with it the idea that philosophy can give us information about the world. Wittgenstein rejects traditional philosophy as synthesis or analysis.

Wittgenstein's philosophy contains many seminal and original ideas but it also has affinities with other thought and other philosophical ideas and schools. These include the following: psychoanalysis, Socratic dialectic, phenomenology, Zen Buddhism, the pragmatist and instrumentalist views on language (including John Dewey's idea that the meaning of a word is its use), existentialism and hermeneutics. He also has affinities with the thinking of the following philosophers: Aristotle, Martin Heidegger, John Dewey, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, G. E. Moore and St. Augustine (especially his views on time).

Wittgenstein's thought has influenced other disciplines besides philosophy. This includes law, linguistics, literary theory, aesthetics and art criticism, architecture, political thought, the theory and philosophy of history, educational theory, sociology, social anthropology and philosophical psychology.

Wittgenstein's very influential thought was the creation of an unusual intellect and a widely gifted person. According to persons who knew Wittgenstein at Cambridge University (England), Wittgenstein was sometimes a spellbinding and terrifying person. He had piercing, unnerving eyes. He was a person with many talents.

Eric Heller describes Wittgenstein as . . . A logician of the first order; a writer of German prose abundant in intellectual passion and disciplined clarity . . . an engineer of great promise and some achievement; the architect of a modern mansion; a gifted sculptor; a musician who probably would have become, had he chosen this career, a remarkable conductor; a hermit capable of enduring long periods of the utmost rigors of mind and loneliness; a rich man who chose poverty; a Cambridge professor who thought and taught but neither lectured nor dined. 1

During his years at Cambridge University (1929-1947), Wittgenstein was sometimes described as a "mystery man." He published nothing, except one article, during this time. Notes from his lectures (later to be known as The Blue and Brown Books) were printed and circulated clandestinely. Few persons, if anyone, understood what Wittgenstein was talking about in his discussions at Cambridge. This made his ideas even more mysterious. Wittgenstein was extremely disappointed that he was not understood. He saw much more deeply into philosophical problems than other philosophers at Cambridge. G. E. Moore (a noted Cambridge philosopher) once remarked that when he (Moore) read a paper at the Moral Sciences Club, Wittgenstein was often the only one who looked puzzled.

Wittgenstein had a deep love of truth. Norman Malcolm, in his moving biography, Ludwig Wittgenstein, says the following:

He was constantly fighting with the deepest philosophical problems. Wittgenstein was uncompromising; he had to have complete understanding. He drove himself fiercely. His whole body was under a tension. No one at his lectures could fail to perceive that he strained his will, as well as his intellect, to the utmost. This was one aspect of his absolute, relentless honesty. Primarily what made him an awesome and even terrible person... was his ruthless integrity. 2

Malcolm also speaks of Wittgenstein's strong need for affection.

Another time he said: "Although I cannot give affection, I have a great need for it." Human kindness, human concern, was for him a far more important attribute in a person than intellectual power or cultivated taste. 3

The literature on Wittgenstein is very large and growing. Studies, including books, articles, book reviews, critical notices, theses and dissertations on Wittgenstein or his thought number over 7,000.4 However, little is known of him outside of professional philosophy.

Wittgenstein's ancestry was Jewish but he was brought up a Roman Catholic. He was intensely musical as was the rest of his family. His father was a wealthy steel industrialist. Wittgenstein studied mathematics and physical science at preparatory school and had two years of mechanical engineering at a technical college in Berlin.

In the fall of 1908 Wittgenstein went to Manchester University in England to study aeronautical engineering. While at Manchester, his interests began to shift to pure mathematics and then to the philosophical foundations of mathematics. He came across Bertrand Russell's book, Principles of Mathematics, which greatly excited him. Wittgenstein was advised to go to Cambridge to study mathematics under Russell, which he did.

After studying with Russell at Cambridge (1911-1913) and serving in the German army as an artillery officer in World War I, Wittgenstein wrote his first book, the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, first published in English in 1921. From 1920 to 1926, Wittgenstein taught elementary school at various remote Austrian villages. He returned to Cambridge as a lecturer in 1929 submitting (by then) the famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as his Ph.D. dissertation. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore were the examiners on Wittgenstein's oral examination for the Ph.D. The oral examination was easily passed by Wittgenstein with many humorous remarks by Russell and Moore. Wittgenstein was already world-famous because of the book. However this did not prevent him from later doubting or questioning what he had stated in the book as unassailable truths. Wittgenstein left Cambridge in 1947.

According to Norman Malcolm, one of Wittgenstein's few friends, Wittgenstein had a very disappointing but certainly not meaningless life. By his actions and manner of living, Wittgenstein set an example for others. For instance, he inherited a fortune but gave it to his sister. Contrary to the materialistic attitude of present-day people, Wittgenstein had no desire for material things. He lived a very austere existence, owning no property and retaining only the barest amount of necessities.

The following is an account of some of Wittgenstein's ideas on language and philosophy.

For Wittgenstein, our everyday language is OK the way it is. It is "...in order as it is." Ordinary (everyday) language is OK for philosophers to use (in philosophy) as long as words are used in their everyday, ordinary sense. Philosophy as synthesis or analysis (in the traditional sense) is not needed. In one sense, the common lay-person knows as much as any philosopher. According to Wittgenstein, philosophers should

...stick to the subjects of our everyday thinking and not go astray and imagine that we have to decribe extreme subtleties... 4

This describing of extreme subtleties is what some philosophers try to do when describing "inner states." For instance, G. E. Moore attempts to do this when he attempts to see what "consciousness" is. Yet Moore admits that

The moment we try to fix our attention on consciousness to see distinctly what it is, it seems to vanish. 5

Here I think Wittgenstein would say that Moore is not aware that he already knows what "consciousness" is.

In a related issue, I believe Wittgenstein might say that cognitive researchers are misguided when they attempt to reduce consciousness or mind to a physical state or formal system. The computational-philosophy-of-mind approach, as stated by Jerry A. Fodor in his book The Language of Thought, wants to explain the human mind, including consciousness, in terms of a formal system. This would supposedly explain "mental" processes. Mental or "inner" processes, according to this approach, are what give meaning to language. In contrast to this, Wittgenstein states,

...this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is. 6

Here the "inner process," as I understand it, could be mental, physical or formal as in a computer program. This representation of the "inner process" can prevent us from understanding what is going on when we are using our language. Computational philosophers of the mind are "lost" when they don't see the meaning of a word like "mind" as it is ordinarily used.

If Wittgenstein's ideas are correct, human thought and behavior cannot be explained solely in terms of science. Human beings should not be considered simply as another object in nature. This has echoes in existentialist thought. According to Wittgensteinian thinking, the human mind cannot be explained in terms of objective causal processes. I understand Wittgensteinian thinking to mean or imply that human consciousness or human perception is primary in existence. For instance, mathematical thinking, even though abstract, would not be possible without human perception. Perception cannot be explained scientifically. Nor can consciousness. To be human is to have consciousness. Consciousness is not something to be investigated apart from human experience.

If everything Wittgenstein says is true, where does this leave philosophy? In one sense everything in philosophy is changed and in another sense nothing is changed. Wittgenstein's thinking appears to be basically critical or destructive with nothing to replace what has been destroyed. But as he says, we are destroying nothing but "houses of cards."

Wittgenstein's purpose in his book Philosophical Investigations is to clear up linguistic muddles or as he puts it, "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." His originality is in his emphasis on language as it is used - spoken or written - and not on a Cartesian self - a speaker or hearer. This does not mean that the self is not important. The self should not be considered as an isolated object but as an active entity in contact with the world. This includes communicating with other persons.

Tempting as the idea may be, Wittgenstein should not be placed within a school of philosophy or classified as a phenomenologist or as an existentialist which has been done. His thought, however, does have relationships to the above classifications.

Wittgenstein's philosophy does not present a system, set of beliefs or doctrines. His thought may be interpreted as indicating that there can be no reality apart from any description of it. This description must necessarily use language. Once this premise is accepted, then it appears that language definitely shapes reality. It follows from Wittgenstein's thinking that the concepts which determine reality are linguistic and pictorial, not mental, and that reality cannot be understood in a strictly intellectual or analytic manner.

Footnotes

1. Eric Heller, "Wittgenstein: Unphilosophical Notes" in Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and His Philosophy, K. T. Fann (Ed.) p. 89. 2. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, p. 27. 3. Ibid. p. 161. 4. Gernot Gable, Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Comprehensive Bibliography of International Theses and Dissertations, 1933-1985, preface p. 5. 5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #106. 6. G. A. Paul, "Wittgenstein" in The Revolution in Philosophy, Gilbert Ryle (Ed.) p. 91. 7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #305.

 


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